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INVOLUNTARY PASSIVE EUTHANASIA OF BRAIN-




In recent years the practice by physicians of involuntary passive
euthanasia' in the form of withholding or withdrawing life-support
systems from brain-stem-damaged patients has become widespread.2
This practice exists even though terminating treatment which
hastens the death of a patient arguably constitutes culpable homi-
cide under traditional legal standards.3 Our society is now faced
with two principal choices: accepting the practice of allowing the
attending physician to determine his own standards for terminating
life; or regulating the practice by enacting legislation setting forth
legal standards for terminating life.
This Comment will examine present medical and legal standards
regarding involuntary passive euthanasia of brain-stem-damaged
patients and propose a statute to legalize involuntary passive
euthanasia under certain restrictive conditions.
MEDICAL STANDARDS REGARDING THE TREATMENT
OF BRAIN-STEM-DAMAGED PATIENTS
The Use of Life Support Systems to Save Potentially Brain
Damaged Patients
The physician's decision to prolong or terminate the life of a brain-
stem-damaged patient is a recent medical problem. Prior to the
use of new life-support systems, many of these patients would die
1. The term "involuntary passive euthanasia" is used here to denote the
withholding of treatment from a patient without his consent, as opposed
to "voluntary active euthanasia," which occurs when the patient consents
to active treatment to cause his death.
2. See text accompanying notes 17-23 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 30-42 infra.
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of natural causes. Deprivation of oxygen, either through the inter-
ruption of the blood supply or oxygenation of the blood, causes
brain damage.4 All brain damage is irreversible, but the degree
of damage is determined by the duration of the interruption of oxy-
gen.5 If the brain is deprived of oxygen for three to five minutes,
all of the cells in the cerebral cortex, which controls consciousness,
thinking, and reasoning, are destroyed.6 After fifteen minutes, the
rest of the cells in the midbrain and brain stem are destroyed, and
the brain can no longer maintain vital bodily functions, including
spontaneous breathing and heartbeat, and the patient dies.7
The application of life-support systems by the physician can
interrupt the above sequence of events. It is now possible to main-
tain both circulation and respiration by mechanical means. A
cardiac pacemaker wired to the heart maintains circulation by
rythmically discharging electrical current, causing the heart to con-
tract.8 A respirator completely takes over breathing, controlling
the exact flow of oxygen and corresponding exit of carbon dioxide.0
An immediate application of these machines will restore oxygen to
the brain and prevent its further destruction.
There are times when cerebral functioning is absent, but restora-
tion is still possible.10 Therefore, an unconscious patient rushed to
an emergency room after suffering cardiac arrest will immediately
be placed on these machines in an effort to save his life. Unfor-
tunately, the application of these devices is frequently only partially
successful, and the physician is left with a patient whose heartbeat
or respiration is maintained mechanically, but whose brain is se-
verely and irreversibly damaged.1'
The cost of sustaining such patients can be extremely high. First,
the family or relatives are faced with an emotional and financial
drain.12 Second, the community must provide medical staff and
4. See 3 M. HOUTS & I. H. HAUT, COURTROOM MEDICINE § 1.01 (2) (a)
(1971).
5. Id. § 1.01 (3) (d).
6. Biorck, When is Death?, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 484.
7. Id.
8. Wasmuth, The Medical, Legal, and Ethical Considerations of Human
Organ Transplantation, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 636 (1970).
9. Bellegie, Medical Technology As It Exists Today, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
31 (1975).
10. Olinger, Medical Death, Id. at 22.
11. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Ex-
amine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205
J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
12. In the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, discussed in text accompanying
notes 76-92 infra, a severely brain-damaged patient required a respirator
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costly medical facilities. 13 Finally, other patients may be denied
access to medical services.
14
Respirators and pacemakers, non-existent a short time ago, are
now being widely utilized.15 With increased application of these
devices, a standard of prolonging "life" as long as possible means
that "immense resources would have to be employed to provide care
for ever increasing numbers of irreversibly comatose patients being
sustained indefinitely at a level of existence commonly disparaged
as akin to that of a 'vegetable.' "16
The Withdrawal of Life-Support Systems to Permit Dying
With the physician's increased capacity to treat brain-damaged
patients, the traditional view that decisions of treatment should be
made entirely on the basis of physiological aspects is giving way
to the more modern view that social as well as physiological factors
should be considered.17  These sociological factors include: (1)
whether the patient is salvageable; (2) the quality of life to which
in order to be kept alive. The medical costs were $450 a day. The San
Diego Union, Nov. 2, 1975, at C-1, col. 1.
13. Dr. Walter Sackett testified before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee in
1972 that Florida had 1,500 severely retarded patients and
[a]ccording to present-day cost and the fact that you can keep
these individuals alive artifically to between [ages] 50 to 60, it's
going to cost the State of Florida for 50 years $5 billion. Translated
roughly this means it's going to cost the various States over this
same period over $100 billion ....
Death with Dignity: An Inquiry Into Related Public Issues: Hearings Be-
fore the Special Subcomm. on Aging, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1972).
14. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Death with Dignity,
supra note 13, indicated that there is a shortage of kidney dialysis machines.
Dr. Walter Sackett testified:
The kidney dialysis group was asking for $500,000, and when he
said the State doesn't have it, this meant that we are going to have
to let 125 people, half of the people who had treatable kidney
disease in Florida had to be allowed to die .... Now where is
the benefit in these 1,500 severely retarded, who never had a ra-
tional thought, and still we are going to let 125 people whose lives
could be prolonged in a useful state ... die because we are pour-
ing all this money into these huge institutions?
Death with Dignity, supra note 13, at 30.
15. Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally Ill, 206
J.A.M.A. 387 (1968).
16. Potter, The Paradoxical Preservation of a Principle, 13 ViLu. L. REV.
784 (1968).
17. D. CRANE, THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS' TREATMENT OF
CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 2 (1975).
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the patient can be expected to return; (3) whether the patient can
measurably benefit from further treatment; and (4) the adverse
effects continued treatment may have on the patient's family or
other patients.
I8
The application of these sociological considerations in determining
treatment has led to the widespread practice of involuntary passive
euthanasia of brain-stem-damaged patients.19 In 1974, testimony
before a Senate Subcommittee pointed out that "about three-
fourths of American physicians say they practice 'passive' eu-
thanasia regularly-that is they withdraw artificial life support and
permit dying.120 This practice is not limited to adult patients, but
seems especially prevalent among defective newborns.21 "At least
once a week, a doctor somewhere in the Washington metropolitan
area decides that one of his infant patients has no chance of mean-
ingful life and withholds medical treatment needed to keep the
child alive."22 It is estimated overall that "several thousand" in-
fants per year die as a result of having treatment withheld or with-
drawn.
23
The medical community has not articulated any guidelines to aid
the physician in his decision to terminate treatment. It is only
within the last five years that a few teaching hospitals have estab-
lished ethics committees to aid the physician in such decision.24 As
a result, the decision about when and under what conditions treat-
ment should be terminated has been left solely to the attending
18. Id. 3-13. Ms. Crane also lists two other possible factors: (1) if the
patient is rational his attitude toward the resumption of his social roles;
and (2) the relative value or social worth of the patient's roles.
19. See Steel & Hill, A Plea for a Legal Right to Die, 29 OKLA. L. REV.
328 (1976).
20. Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare. 93 Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1974).
21. Horan, Euthanasia, Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child:
Death As a Treatment of Choice?, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 76 (1975); Robertson,
Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 213 (1975).
22. When M.D. Decides Baby Has No Meaningful Chance, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, March 17, 1974.
23. See Medical Ethics, supra note 20, at 26. "Approximately 7,500
infants ivith severe mental or physical handicaps are born in this country
each year to mothers over thirty-five.... One of the most common
problems is Down's Syndrome (mongolism)." HYIETS & MANGEL, THE
RIGHT TO DIE 49 (1975).
24. S.F. Chronicle, July 21, 1976, at 14, col. 1. The article cites only four
hospitals that have established ethics committees: Massachusetts General
Hospital in Boston, University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Children's
Hospital of Pittsburgh, and Johns Hopkins in Baltimore.
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physician. He is guided only by his medical expertise, morals, and
conscience. Given the nature of these factors, it is doubtful that a
uniform standard is being applied. The use of social criteria for
making these decisions is inherently ambiguous because "it is very
difficult to say at what point an alert individual ceases to interact
meaningfully with his social environment. ' ' 25 The physician must
decide when a human being is no longer a human being. There is a
spectrum of existence from alert consciousness to cellular life and
it becomes a question of picking somewhere along the spectrum.
Finally, one can expect the standard of treatment to vary depending
upon such factors as the physician's personal background, the geo-
graphical area of practice, and the specific economic or social class
of the patient or the patient's family.
The practice of involuntary passive euthanasia under these cir-
cumstances is susceptible to abuse or mistake. One example of
abuse is an incident in which the attending physician acquiesced
in the parents' request not to operate on a "Down's Syndrome" baby
with duodenal arteresa.26 The parents did not want the burden of
a mongoloid child. It took the baby fifteen days to die of starva-
tion. The tragedy of this case is that except for brain damage,
the child would have been reasonably healthy, requiring a limited
amount of medical care.
While the medical community can determine when a patient is
suffering from irreversible brain-stem-damage, the question of what
should be done with such an individual remains. The answer
is not simply a technical medical matter.
27
LEGAL STANDARDS REGARDING INVOLUNTARY PASSIVE
EUTHANASIA OF BRAIN-STEM-DAMAGED PATIENTS
Traditional Common Laws: Responsibility of the Physician for
Homicide
The practice of involuntary passive euthanasia by withholding
or withdrawing life-support systems from brain-stem-damaged
patients which hastens the death of that patient arguably con-
stitutes unlawful homicide.2 8 1 say "arguably" because there are no
25. CRANE, supra note 17, at 3.
26. Robertson, supra note 21.
27. See Skegg, Irreversibly Comatose Individuals: "Alive" or "Dead"?,
33 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 130 (1974).
28. See In, re Karen Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 349 A.2d 801 (1975),
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reported cases of a physician being indicted for homicide arising
out of terminating treatment which has accelerated his patient's
death.
29
The Law of Homicide
Murder is the killing of another human being with malice afore-
thought.30 Malice does not require ill will, but merely the intent
to kill or inflict bodily injury.31 As explained by the court in
People v. Conley,32 "one who commits euthanasia bears no ill will
toward his victim and believes his act is morally justified, but he
nonetheless acts with malice .... ,,33
Humanitarian motives have never been a defense to murder.3 4
The court in State v. Ehlers-3 pointed out "[i]f the proved facts
established that the defendant did the killing willfully, that is, with
the intent to kill ... there is murder ... no matter what defend-
ant's motive may have been .... 36 The fact that the victim is
dying does not relieve criminal responsibility. 37 In State v. Francis38
modified and remanded, 137 N.J. 10, 335 A.2d 647 (1976), discussed in text
accompanying notes 76-92 infra.
29. See Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REv. 999 (1967); Sanders,
Euthanasia: None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L. 351 (1969).
Only two physicians have ever been indicted for active euthanasia. In
1950, Dr. Hermann Sander was treating a patient dying of spreading recur-
rent carcinoma of the large bowel. Dr. Sander pumped four syringes of air
into the patient's vein until she died. Dr. Sander was indicted for murder.
He claimed that the patient was dead when he injected the air, and the
jury found him not guilty. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1950, at 1, col. 1 (late city
ed.).
In 1974, Dr. Vincent Montemarano injected potassium chloride into his
unconscious patient who was dying of cancer of the mouth that had spread
to the neck and carotid artery. He was indicted for homicide, and the jury
found him not guilty. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1974, at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.).
Two major reasons can be given for the failure of prosecuting authorities
to indict. First, no complaint is filed. If parents or relatives are involved,
they have already agreed that termination to permit death is the best solu-
tion. Second, prosecuting authorities do not want to waste limited re-
sources when, because of the status of the parties involved, the extent of
the criminal penalty for murder, and the problem of proving causation, con-
viction is extremely unlikely. See Robertson, supra note 21.
30. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 1969).
31. Id. at 35.
32. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
33. Id. at 332, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
34. People v. Tice, 257 Iowa 84, 130 N.W.2d 678 (1964); State v. Ehlers,
98 N.J.L. 236, 119 A. 15 (1922).
35. 98 N.J.L. 236, 119 A. 15 (1922).
36. Id. at 240, 119 A. at 17.
37. State v. Mally, 139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961); Blackburn v. State,
23 Ohio St. 146 (1872); State v. BeBee, 113 Utah 398, 195 P.2d 746 (1948).
38. 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929). In Francis the victim was stabbed,
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the court stated that "if any life at all is left in a human body, even
the least spark, the extinguishment of it is as much homicide as
the killing of the most vital being."3 9 Humanitarian motives and
the victim's hopeless condition, which distinguish involuntary pas-
sive euthanasia from other forms of murder, are irrelevant under
common law.
Culpable homicide is the killing of a living human being.40
Therefore, under common law the killing of an unborn but viable
fetus is infanticide, not homicide, because the fetus is not considered
a living human being.4 1 The biological life characteristics of an
unborn but viable fetus are similar to those of a severely brain-
damaged patient; both have physiological life, but neither has full
consciousness. It may be contended that a human being is no
longer a human being when he has lost his ability to maintain a
conscious, reasoning, and thinking state.42 It follows that the
removal of life-support systems from a severely brain-damaged pati-
ent which hastens the patient's death is not murder because the
patient is not a human being. Whatever the merits of such an argu-
ment, it would merely reduce the physician's responsibility to the
analogous crime of infanticide.
The Physician's Obligation to Continue Treatment
A physician's responsibility for homicide arises only if he has a
legal duty, as opposed to a moral obligation, to act.43 A physician
is under no legal duty to accept a patient,44 nor is the physician
legally required to render aid to one who is dying.45 The physi-
shot, and hit with a blunt instrument by four defendants. Medical testi-
mony indicated that at least one of the bullet wounds, two knife wounds,
and the blow on the skull, all or any of them, were sufficient to cause
the death of the victim.
39. Id. at 60, 149 S.E. 348 at 364.
40. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CuimvNA LAw 530 (1972).
41. PERKINS, supra note 30, at 29.
42. See Elkinton, The Dying Patient, The Doctor and The Law, 13 VILL.
L. REV. 740 (1968); Olinger, supra note 10.
43. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907); See PER-
KiNs, supra note 30, at 592-600.
44. Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 69 N.E. 1058 (1901); Rice v.
Rinaldo, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 119 N.E.2d 657 (App. 1951).
45. Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959); Butters-
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cian's legal duty to provide care arises by contract, either express
or implied, or by law, if he voluntarily undertakes to provide care. 40
As a general rule, even though the withholding of treatment consti-
tutes an omission, if there is a legal duty imposed by law or con-
tract, and the omission to perform that duty results in the death
of the person to whom that duty was owed, the person failing to
perform such a duty has committed unlawful homicide.
47
The legal duty of the physician to provide care, once initiated,
must continue until it is ended by consent or revocation, or until
the physician's services are no longer needed.48 It could be argued
that when a brain-damaged patient is in a persistent vegetative
state, the physician's services are no longer needed, and the physi-
cian therefore has no futher legal obligation to maintain treatment.
Unfortunately, there is little, if any, case law to indicate when a
physician's services are no longer needed.49 A few cases (not in-
volving physicians) have held that when a defendant incurs a legal
duty by undertaking to provide care, no liability will be imposed un-
less the defendant's conduct has made the party worse off than he
was before. 50 At least in severe brain damage cases, the physician
might contend that by removing life-support machines the patient
worth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936); Hurley v. Edding-
field, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901).
46. Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 609, 119 So. 647 (1929); Spencer v. West,
126 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 1960); Peterson v. Phelps, 123 Minn. 319, 143
N.W. 793 (1913).
47. Pallis v. State, 123 Ala. 12, 26 So. 339 (1899); State v. Benton, 38
Del. 1, 187 A. 609 (193.6); Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 93 S.W.
646 (1906). For a discussion of whether the act of turning off a mechan-
ical respirator constitutes an act or omission, see Fletcher, Prolonging Life,
42 WASH. L. REv. 999 (1967).
48. Dale v. Donaldson Lumber Co., 48 Ark. 188, 2 S.W. 703 (1887); Miller
v. Dore, 154 Me. 363, 148 A.2d 692 (1959); Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354,
236 N.W. 622 (1931); Boyd v. Andrae, 44 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. App. 1932); Hal-
verson v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 113, 232 N.W. 754 (1930); Welch v. Frisbie
Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939); McManus v. Donlin, 23
Wis. 2d 289, 127 N.W.2d 22 (1964).
49. In In re Karen Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), discussed
in text accompanying notes 76-92 infra, the court held that an irreversibly
brain-damaged patient's life-support system could be removed even though
the patient was alive. However, the decision was based on the patient's
constitutional right of privacy to terminate treatment as exercised through
her legal guardian. One must distinguish between the physician's services
being terminated because of revocation by the patient and the physician's
services being terminated because the physician feels his services are no
longer needed.
50. United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962); Lacey v.
United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1951); Kearns v. Smith, 55 Cal.
App. 2d 532, 131 P.2d 36 (1942); Kuchynski v. Urkyn, 89 N.H. 400, 200 A.
416 (1938).
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has not been made "worse off." The essence of this argument, taken
to its logical conclusion, is that the patient was, for all practical
purposes, dead.
Finally, it has been suggested that even though a doctor has a
duty to continue treatment, his duty extends only to ordinary
means of care.51 An often quoted guideline between ordinary and
extraordinary care is the statement of Pope Pius X11 52 that a
doctor is not obligated to provide care "which cannot be obtained
by or used without excessive expense, pain, or other incon-
venience, or which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of
benefit."53 Following this guideline, a physician does not have a
duty to maintain brain-stem-damaged patients on life-support de-
vices because there is no reasonable hope of future benefit. This dis-
tinction between ordinary and extraordinary care, however, has not
been recognized by case law, nor is it "necessarily the view a court
would take of the law."54
Legal Definition of Death
By definition, homicide cannot be committed on a person who
is dead.55 Thus, the criminal responsibility of the physician for re-
moving life-support machines may depend upon the legal definition
of death. However, present legal standards offer the physician little
leeway. The traditional legal definition of death is "[t] he cessa-
tion of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total
stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the
animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as respiration,
pulsation, etc.
''56
51. Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of
Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 54 (1975); Kennedy, The Karen Quinlan
case: Problems and Proposals, 2 J. MED. ETHICS, March 1976, at 3; Robert-
son, supra note 21.
52. Papal allocution to a congress of anaesthetists, 24 November 1957.
Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1027-33 (1957).
53. Id.
54. Kennedy, supra note 51, at 6.
55. State v. Simpson, 244 N.C. 325, 93 S.E.2d 425 (1956).
56. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968). For cases adhering to
the total cessation of circulation and respiration as a criterion for death, see
Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 622, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958); Estate of Schmidt,
261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950); Telefilm, Inc. v. Superior Court, 194 P.2d
542 (Cal. App. 1948); Sauers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 465, 218 P.2d 741 (1950);
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This traditional legal definition of death-the total cessation of
circulation-has come under increasing attack with the advent of
organ transplantation and artificial devices for maintaining life.5 7 A
surgeon has very little time to remove a heart, liver, or lung from
the donor and transplant it to the donee.58 If the physician has
to wait until there is a total cessation of circulation before remov-
ing the donor's organ, the organ will have already begun to deteri-
orate, thus significantly reducing the chances of a successful trans-
plant.59 To meet the requirements for transplantation, the medical
community proposed the adoption of a total brain-death standard. 60
In re Davenport's Estate, 79 Idaho 548, 323 P.2d 611 (1958); Prudential Ins.
Co. of America v. Spain, 339 Ill. App. 476, 90 N.E.2d 256 (1950); United
Trust Co. v. Pike, 199 Kan. 1, 427 P.2d 67 (1967); Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.
2d 496 (Ky. App. 1952); Vaegemast v. Hess, 203 Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641
(1938); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961); Taylor v. Cawood,
211 S.W. 47 (Mo. 1919); Finch v. Edwards, 239 Mo. App. 788, 198 S.W.2d
655 (1946); Evans v. Halterman, 31 Ohio App. 175, 165 N.E. 869 (1928);
Glover v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1963); White v. Taylor, 155 Tex. 392,
286 S.W.2d 925 (1956); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d
788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Sanger v. Butler, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 527, 101 S.W.
459 (1907); Stead v. Department of Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 171, 61 P.2d
1307 (1936).
57. Report of the Ad Hoe Committee of Harvard Medical School, supra
note 11.
58. Wasmuth, supra note 8.
59. Corday, Life-Death in Human Transplantation, 55 A.B.A.J. 629
(1969).
60. The most widely accepted criterion is that of the Ad Hoc Committee
of the Harvard Medical School. The Harvard Committee explains total
brain death as follows:
An organ, brain, or other, that no longer functions and has no
possibility of functioning again is for all practical purposes dead.
Our first problem is to determine the characteristics of a perman-
ently nonfunctioning brain.
A patient in this state appears in a deep coma. The conditions
satisfactorily diagnosed by points A, B, and C to follow. The en-
cephalogram (point D) provides confirmatory data, and when
available it should be utilized ....
A. Unreceptivity and Unresponsitivity
There is a total unawareness of externally applied stimuli and
inner need and complete unresponsiveness-our definition of irre-
versible coma. Even the most intensely painful stimuli evoke no
vocal or other response, not even a groan, withdrawl of a limb, or
quickening of respiration.
B. No Movements or Breathing
Observations covering a period of at least one hour by physicians
are adequate to satisfy the criteria of no spontaneous muscular
movements or spontaneous respiration or response to stimuli such
as pain, touch, sound, or light. After the patient is on a mechanical
respirator, the total absence of spontaneous breathing may be es-
tablished by turning off the respirator for three minutes and ob-
serving whether there is any effort on the part of the subject to
breath spontaneously. (The respirator may be turned off for this
time provided that at the start of the trial period the patient's car-
bon dioxide tension is within the normal range, and provided also
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The adoption of the brain-death standard means that the surgeon
may remove the organ while circulation or respiration is maintained
mechanically, thus preventing deterioration of the organ.61
The total brain-death standard has come before the courts twice.
In 1972, in Tucker v. Lower,62 a physician was sued for the wrong-
ful death of a heart transplant donor. The patient suffered total
brain death and was being sustained artificially prior to removal
of the heart. The plaintiff maintained that under the traditional
legal standard, the surgeon caused the death of the patient because
he removed the heart while it was still beating. The judge gave
an unprecedented instruction and told the jury they could consider
irreversible loss of all function of the brain as a criterion for de-
termining death. 8 The jury found in favor of the defendant sur-
that the patient had been breathing room air for at least 10 minutes
prior to the trial).
C. No Reflexes
Irreversible coma with abolition of central nervous system activ-
ity is evidenced in part by the absence of elicitable reflexes. The
pupil will be fixed and dilated and will not respond to a direct
source of bright light. Since the establishment of a fixed, dilated
pupil is clear-cut in clinical practice, there should be no uncertainty
as to its presence. Ocular movement (to head turning and to irrita-
tion of the ears with ice water) and blinking are absent. There
is no evidence of postural activity (decerebrate or other) swallow-
ing, yawning, vocalization are in abeyance. Corneal and pharyn-
geal reflexes are absent ....
D. Flat Electroencephalogram
Of great confirmatory value is the flat or isoteric EEG ....
We consider it prudent to have one channel of the apparatus used
for an electrocardiogram. This channel will monitor the ECG so
that, if it appears in the electroencephalographic leads because of
high resistance, it can be readily identified. It also establishes the
presence of the active heart in the absence of the EEG .... The
apparatus should be run at standard gains 10 v/mm, 50 v/mm.
Also it should be isoteric at double this standard gains which is
5 v/mm or 25 v/mm. At least ten full minutes of recording are
desirable, but twice that would be better.
All of the above tests shall be repeated at least 24 hours later
with no change.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Harvard Medical School, supra note 11,
at 337-8. For additional medical proposals for determining a criteria for
brain death, see Comment, The Criteria for Determining Death in Vital Or-
gan Transplants-A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REV. 220 (1973).
61. Wasmuth, supra note 8.
62. Civ. No. 2381 (Court of Law & Equity, Richmond, Va. 1972). For
a complete account of the case, see Mosher, When Does Life End?, The Na-
tional Observer, June 3, 1972, at 1, col. 1. See also Comment, But When
Did He Die? Tucker v. Lower and the Brain Death Concept, 12 SAN DiEco
L. REv. 424 (1975).
63. The instruction in Tucker was as follows:
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geon. However, because it was a general verdict, it cannot be said
with certainty that the jury accepted the brain-death criterion.
In 1974, in People v. Lyons,64 an individual was shot in the head
during an argument. After the victim had been sustained artifi-
cially for two days, the doctors determined that he had suffered
total brain death and removed the heart for transplantation. The
person who shot the victim was charged with murder. He raised
the defense that under the traditional legal definition of death the
victim did not die until his heart was removed by the surgeon. The
judge ruled as a matter of law that the victim was dead when
"based upon the usual and customary standards of medical practice,
it is determined that the person has suffered an irreversible cessa-
tion of brain function." 65
Neither Tucker nor Lyons was appealed. As a result of these
cases and the need to meet organ transplantation requirements, at
least seven states have enacted brain-death statutes.60 The Califor-
nia brain-death statute provides: "A person shall be pronounced
dead if it is determined by a physician that the person has suffered
a total and irreversible cessation of brain function .... "07
Even under the total brain-death standard there are still irrever-
sibly brain-damaged patients in a persistent vegetative state with
no cognitive functioning who are legally alive.0 8 The total brain-
death standard requires that all the cells of the cortex, midbrain,
and brain stem be dead.6 9 Therefore, a brain-damaged patient with
In determining the time of death, as aforesaid, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, you may consider the following ele-
ments, none of which should necessarily be considered controlling,
although you may feel under the evidence that one or more of these
conditions are controlling: The time of the total stoppage of the
circulation of blood; the time of total cessation of the other vital
functions consequent thereto, such as respiration and pulsation; the
time of complete and irreversible loss of all function of the brain;
and, whether or not the aforesaid functions were spontaneous or
were being maintained artifically or mechanically.
64. No. 66072 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oakland, Ca., 1974). See Friloux, Death,
When Does It Occur?, 27 ,BAYLOR L. Rsv. 10 (1975).
65. No. 56072 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oakland, Ca., 1974). See Friloux, supra note
64.
66. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1975); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7180 (West Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 77-202 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 54F (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-2-2.2 (Supp. 1973);
VA. CODE § 32-364.3:1 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-1 (c) (Supp. 1976).
For a discussion of brain death statutes, see Capron & Kass, A Statutory
Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal
and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. . REv. 87 (1972).
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1977).
68. This was the state of Karen Ann Quinlan. In re Karen Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 76-92
infra.
69. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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total cortex and midbrain death, and only partial brain stem death,
destroying consciousness, hearing, speaking, reasoning, and think-
ing, is still legally alive under the brain-death standard.70
The possibility of criminal prosecution exists even though the
physician's responsibility for homicide arising out of terminating
treatment of brain-stem-damaged patients is unclear. Some argue
that tolerating nontreatment by physicians to permit dying opens
a wedge for further, more drastic forms of euthanasia.7'1 They con-
clude that there should be strict enforcement of criminal homicide
laws to stop such practices. The strict enforcement of criminal
homicide laws, however, is not a solution to the present problem.
First, it is likely to force the practice to go further underground.
Physicians are likely to become more secretive. There is already
an unwritten medical practice of not resuscitating terminally ill
patients.7 2  If this practice were to be applied to brain-damaged
patients, it would increase the likelihood that a patient who might
be able to return to some form of a cognitive state would die.7 3
Even if physicians were to place their patients on the respirators
at the outset, the desired result could be reached by failing to main-
tain the machine.7 4 Second, homicide laws work after the fact. No
action would be taken against the physician until after the patient
is already dead. Finally, the fear of criminal prosecution might
create an undesirable backlash in which the physician would decline
to undertake treatment of patients whose chances for success, al-
though possible, were not probable.
75
Recent Developments: The Legalization of Limited Forms
of Euthanasia
Two jurisdictions, one by judicial decision, and the other by
legislation, have recently adopted legal standards which allow a
physician to terminate treatment to permit dying.
70. See text accompanying notes 4-11 supra.
71. See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy
Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958).
72. In re Karen Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 29, 355 A.2d, 647, 657 (1976). Testi-
mony by Dr. Koran: "No physician that I know personally is going to try
and resuscitate a man riddled with cancer."
73. See text accompanying notes 4-11 supra.
74. CRANE, supra note 17, at 74.




On March 31, 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Karen
Quinan78 held that an irreversibly brain-damaged patient's life-
support systems could be removed even though the patient was
legally alive under both standards. Thirteen months prior to the
decision, Karen Ann Quinlan had suffered irreversible brain damage
which left her in a persistent vegetative state with no cognitive
functioning. She used a respirator to maintain breathing." Karen's
parents requested that the life-support machines be turned off, and
in what is now an unusual case, the physician refused to comply.
As a result, Mr. Quinlan sought relief from the courts requesting
an order to have the machines removed.
In the initial consideration of this relief, the New Jersey Superior
Court rejected the Quinlans' request78 It predicated its holding on
the finding that the decision to determine appropriate treatment
is only within the competence of the attending physician, and that
the removal of the life-support machines would constitute unlawful
homicide.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the superior
court's decision.79 Drawing upon the United States Supreme
Court's decisions recognizing the constitutional right of privacy, 80
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the right of privacy "was
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain conditions" 8 1-the conditions being limited
to the finding that there was no compelling state interest essential
to the preservation and sanctity of human life. 2 Under this doc-
trine, a number of courts have compelled patients to undergo life-
saving medical treatment; but in all of these cases the chances of
recovery to a functioning life were extremely high.83 As the New
76. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
77. Id. at 23, 355 A.2d at 654.
78. In re Karen Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (1975).
79. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
80. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. In re Karen Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976). For an
article discussing the right of privacy and euthanasia prior to the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court decision see Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered-The
Choice of Death As an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 Aniz. L. Ray.
474 (1975).
82. In re Karen Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
83. Jones v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George,
239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
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Jersey Court pointed out, "the State's interest . . . weakens and
the individual's right of privacy grows as the degree of bodily in-
vasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes
a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State inter-
est."84 The New Jersey Supreme Court found that there was no
compelling state interest to keep Karen alive if the hospital's Ethics
Committee or a like body agreed that there was no reasonable possi-
bility of Karen emerging from her comatose condition to a cog-
nitive, sapient state.8
5
The holding in Quinlan that the state does not have a compelling
interest to preserve all forms of biological life is supported by Roe
v. Wade.8 6 There the Supreme Court stated: "With respect to the
State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'com-
pelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then pre-
sumably has the capacity of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb."8
7
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan recognized that a
comatose patient cannot consciously exercise her constitutional right
of privacy. Therefore, the court held that the only way to prevent
the destruction of this right was to appoint a guardian who would
render his best judgment as to whether the patient would exercise
the right under the circumstances.88
Finally, with regard to the criminal responsibility of the physi-
cian for removing the life-support machines, the court stated that
the constitutional protection extends to third parties whose action
is necessary to effectuate the exercise of that right. Therefore,
they would not be subject to civil or criminal liability.8 9
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan
Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc.
2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965). But see In re Osborn, 294 A.2d 372
(D.C. App. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435
(1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962). See
Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment:
Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228
(1973).
84. 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
85. Id.
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. Id. at 163.
88. 70 N.J. 10, 42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
89. Id. at 52, 355 A.2d at 670.
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The Quinlan case is of somewhat limited value in terms of legally
regulating the current practice of involuntary passive euthanasia
of brain-stem-damaged patients by physicians. First, while Quin-
lan provides certain guidelines for a physician to follow, it does
not provide any mandatory pre-termination review by a judicial
body. If a court is to be involved in the decision-making process,
the initiative would have to come from the physician himself. He
would have to voluntarily give up his decision-making role and re-
quest that the court appoint a guardian in the hope that the
guardian would request the removal of the machines. Second,
Quinlan represents a single decision in one jurisdiction. An at-
tempt to set out a uniform legal standard would require a series
of court decisions, and it is extremely undesirable for the physi-
cian's legal "duty to be set down piecemeal as the result of decided
cases."90
However, under Quinlan, any physician who was truly con-
cerned with criminal prosecution could avoid such prosecution and
possibly achieve the desired results by seeking a court order to
remove the machines. 91 In addition, Quinlan is valuable as persua-
sive authority to uphold legislation legalizing involuntary passive
euthanasia against a constitutional attack that the state has an
interest to preserve the sanctity of life.
0 2
California's Natural Death Act
California is the second jurisdiction which has recently legalized
termination of medical treatment under certain conditions. On
September 30, 1976, California enacted "The Natural Death Act."08
The statute allows a competent adult to execute a "Directive to
the Physician" (see Appendix A infra). In the directive, the indi-
vidual declares that should he have an incurable injury, disease, or
illness, which is terminal, and the application of life-sustaining pro-
cedures is or would only postpone an imminent death, whether or
not such procedures are utilized, such procedures are to be withheld
or withdrawn.
The statute defines "terminal condition" as: "an incurable condi-
tion caused by injury, disease, or illness which, regardless of the
90. Kennedy, supra note 51, at 6.
91. On February 11, 1977, Tennessee Chancery Court Judge Herschel
Franks ruled that doctors could legally turn off a respirator that had kept
the comatose patient Della Dockery breathing for three months. Judge
Franks said that the attending physician must find that there is no possibil-
ity of the patient ever emerging from her comatose condition. The decision
is expected to be appealed. The San Diego Union, Feb. 12, 1977, at A-15,
col. 3.
92. See text accompanying notes 90-93.
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAmTY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1977),
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application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-
sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death
of the patient. '94 "Life-sustaining procedures" are defined as:
any medical procedure or intervention which utilizes mechanical
or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital
function, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve
only to artificially prolong the moment of death and where, in the
judgment of the attending physician, death is imminent whether or
not such procedures are utilized.95
The attending physician prior to taking any action must deter-
mine whether the directive complies with the statutory require-
ments. If these requirements are met, the physician is to carry
out the desires of the patient and withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining procedures.
A directive is effective for five years and if the declarant becomes
comatose, the directive shall remain in effect for the duration of
the comatose condition. The statute also provides that a physician
acting in accordance with the provisions shall not be civilly liable
or guilty of any criminal act.
The California-statute does not go far enough in its application
with regard to the practice of involuntary passive euthanasia of
brain-stem-damaged patients. The statute has no effect in legaliz-
ing the withholding or withdrawal of treatment of children or of
those adults who have not had the foresight to make out a
directive before becoming comatose.
A NEW LEGAL STANDARD FOR THE TREATMENT
OF BRAIN-STEM-DAMAGED PATIENTS
The Need for a New Legal Standard
Regardless of the advantages or disadvantages of permitting
involuntary passive euthanasia, 9 6 the practice is widespread among
94. Id. § 7187(f).
95. Id. § 7187(c).
96. See Gurney, Is There a Right to Die? A Study of the Law of Eu-
thanasia, 3 Cum.-SAm. L. REv. 235 (1972); Kamisar, supra note 71; Vodiga,
Euthanasia and the Right to Die-Moral, Ethical, and Legal Perspectives,
51 Cm.-KENT L. RPv. 1 (1974); Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation--A
Rejoinder, 43 MINN. L. Rzv. 1 (1958); Comment, Euthanasia-The Individu-
als' Right To Freedom Of Choice, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 190 (1970).
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physicians treating brain-stem-damaged patients." The issue now
is whether new legal standards should be enacted to regulate the
practice. Presently, the decision about when and under what con-
ditions treatment should be terminated is left solely to the attend-
ing physician. Quinlan does not provide any mandatory pre-termi-
nation review by a judicial body, and it is unlikely that the
physician will give up his decision-making role and begin volun-
tarily requesting judicial determination. The California statute
affects only competent adults who have had the foresight to make
out a directive.
Unfortunately, when the decision is left solely to the attending
physician, the possibility of mistake or abuse exists. This situation
is especially true when the practice is shrouded in secrecy because of
the fear of possible criminal prosecution. There are no articulated
standards to guide the physician in his decision. The decision on
whether to prolong or terminate life is made daily and is "governed
only by the dictates of conscience and social pressure on one ex-
treme and the law of homicide on the other."08
The law in any society is a social instrument used to control
human behavior to meet the needs of that society. To meet the
needs of society, the law must now establish effective legal stand-
ards to regulate the practice of involuntary passive euthanasia in
order to protect the public against the premature killing of patients
whose deaths were not otherwise inevitable. Society is ill served
if our legal system does not establish formal guidelines and proce-
dures for making such decisions.09
A Proposed Statute Regulating Involuntary Passive Euthanasia
A statute legalizing euthanasia must deal with at least three
major factors: (1) specific criteria defining the medical status of
a patient whose treatment may be terminated, (2) procedural
guidelines for applying those criteria, and (3) provisions for the
statute's enforcement.
97. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra. A similar problem existed
with abortions prior to the Roe decision. A large number of illegal abor-
tions were being performed. Regardless of the moral considerations of
abortion, the question became whether abortions should be legalized to regu-
late this underground practice. The need to legalize this practice for the
purpose of regulation became very important because of those people in the
lower economic class who could not afford to pay for quality "black market"
medical services. A significant mortality rate resulted among these women.
98. Comment, The Problem of Prolonged Death: Who Should Decide?
27 BAYLOR L. REv. 169 (1975).
99. See Steel & Hill, supra note 19. They propose a "self-death" statute
which would legalize both Voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.
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The following is a proposed involuntary euthanasia statute:
SECTION 1. Subject to the provisions of this act, it shall be
lawful for a physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining pro-
cedures from a qualified patient.
SECTION 2. For the purposes of this act:
(1) "Physicians" means a medical practitioner licensed under
the appropriate state statutes;
(2) "Life-sustaining procedures" means any medical proce-
dure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artificial
means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, which, when
applied to a qualified patient, would only serve to prolong an
imminent death.
(3) "Qualified patient" means an individual, in respect to
whom two physicians, one being of consultant status, have certi-
fied in writing that the patient is suffering from a condition of brain
damage or deterioration such that the patient has irrecoverably and
irreversibly lost consciousness and the capacity to think and reason.
The certification will also indicate all efforts taken to treat such
an individual.
SECTION 3. Before a physician may withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining procedures pursuant to the provisions of this act, the
physician, hospital, parents, guardian or relatives must petition the
court for an order authorizing the withholding or withdrawal.
Upon receipt of the petition, the court shall within five days
appoint a legal guardian. Within ten days after the petition a hear-
ing shall be held to determine if the patient is a qualified patient
under the provisions of this act. If the court finds that the patient
is a qualified patient it shall issue an order authorizing the with-
holding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures.
SECTION 4. No person shall be under any legal duty to partici-
pate in withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining procedures
authorized under this act.
SECTION 5. A physician acting in accordance with the provision
of this act shall not be guilty of any criminal offense.
A physician acting in accordance with the provisions of this act
shall not be subject to civil liability.
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A physician acting in accordance with the provisions of this act
shall not be deemed in breach of any professional oath or affirma-
tion.
SECTION 6. A physician who withholds or withdraws life-
sustaining procedures from a qualified patient, but fails to act in
accordance with the provisions of this act shall be subject to
punishment of a fine of an amount not exceeding $5,000 and/or sus-
pension of his license to practice up to one year, and/or imprison-
ment for a period not exceeding one year. In addition, the physi-
cian will be deemed not to have acted in a unprivileged way for
the purpose of civil liability.
A physician who withholds or withdraws life-sustaining proce-
dures from a non-qualified patient and thereby hastens the patient's
death shall be subject to prosecution for unlawful homicide.
The effect of this statute would be to legalize involuntary passive
euthanasia in the form of withholding or withdrawing life-sustain-
ing procedures from those patients suffering from severe cerebral
cortex brain damage. This type of patient, according to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, falls within the Quinlan standard-a patient
whose life the state has no compelling interest to preserve.100
The statute has two major procedural safeguards: (1) a certifica-
tion in writing by two physicians of the patient's condition and the
efforts taken to treat the patient, and (2) a judicial hearing to de-
termine the medical status of the patient.
Finally, the statute provides severe penalties for failing to follow
the provisions of the act. Having been provided with the legal
means and guidelines to terminate treatment, a physician who fails
to follow the procedures must be held liable. It will be necessary
for prosecuting authorities to police activities of physicians in order
to deter any violations. After the practice has been legalized, the
prosecuting authorities might be able to receive aid in deterring any
violations by requesting support from the American Medical Asso-
ciation. In addition, a jury armed with the knowledge that a physi-
cian has had a reasonable opportunity to proceed under this type
of statute, but failed to do so, is more likely to convict.
100. See text accompanying notes 88-95 supra. For additional constitu-
tional considerations of such a statute, see Comment, Euthanasia: Criminal,
Tort, Constitutional And Legislative Considerations, 48 NoTms DAME LAW.
1202 (1973).
1296
[VOL. 14: 1277, 1977] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW BEVIEW
CONCLUSION
The medical community has embarked upon the widespread
practice of involuntary passive euthanasia of brain-stem-damaged
patients. The legal system in effect has relinquished the decision-
making role to the attending physician. Unfortunately, the attend-
ing physician has no standards to guide him in his decision-making
process. The practice under these circumstances is susceptible to
mistake or abuse. If our society wants to protect itself against the
possible premature killing of patients, it must establish new legal
standards which will effectively regulate the practice of involun-





Directive made this day of (month, year).
I , being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily make
known my desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged
under the circumstances set forth below, do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or
illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and
where the application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only
to artificially prolong the moment of my death, and where my
physician determines that my death is inminent whether or not
life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such proce-
dures be withheld or withdrawn, and I be permitted to die
naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the
use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this
directive shall be honored by my family and physician (s) as the
final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treat-
ment and accept the consequences from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is
known to my physician, this directive shall have no force or effect
during the course of my pregnancy.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as hav-
ing a terminal condition by - , M.D., whose address is __ I
and whose telephone number is _ . I understand that if I have
not filled in the physician's name and address, it shall be presumed
that I did not have a terminal condition when I made out this
directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the
date filled in above.
6. I understand the full import of this directive, and I am
emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
The declarant has been personally known to me, and I believe him
or her to be of sound mind.
Witness
Witness
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